Bounds on ngerprinting capacity have been derived in recent literature. In this paper we present an exact capacity formula and a universal ngerprinting scheme. Our problem setup uni es the signaldistortion and Boneh-Shaw formulations of ngerprinting. The proposed scheme has four useful properties: (1) the receiver does not need to know the coalition size and collusion channel; (2) a tunable parameter Δ trades off false-positive and false-negative error exponents; (3) the receiver provides a reliability metric for its decision; and (4) the decoder is capacity-achieving when the false-positive exponent Δ tends to zero.
INTRODUCTION
Content ngerprinting (a.k.a. digital ngerprinting, or traitor tracing) is essentially a multiuser version of watermarking. A covertext -such as image, video, audio, text, or software -is to be distributed to many users. Prior to distribution, each user is assigned a ngerprint that is embedded into the covertext. In a collusion attack, a coalition of users combine their marked copies, creating a pirated copy that contains only weak traces of their ngerprints. The pirated copy is subject to a delity requirement relative to the coalition's copies. The delity requirement may take the form of a distortion constraint, which is a natural model for media ngerprinting applications [1] [2] [3] [4] ; or it may take the form of Boneh and Shaw's marking assumption, which is a popular model for software ngerprinting [5] [6] [7] . To trace the forgery back to the coalition members, the receiver needs to decode the colluders' ngerprints from the pirated copy.
The ngerprinting problem presents two key challenges.
1. The number of colluders may be large (dozens of users), which makes it easier for the colluders to mount a strong attack. The dif culty of the decoding problem is compounded by the fact that the number of colluders and the attack channel are unknown to the decoder.
2. There are two fundamental types of error probabilities, namely false positives, by which innocent users are wrongly accused, and false negatives, by which one or more colluders escape detection. The rst type of error is often considered to be more costly.
This paper derives information-theoretic performance limits for a model that captures the above features of ngerprinting systems. Complete derivations are given in [8] . Prior art is reviewed below. The basic performance metric is capacity, which is dened with respect to a class of attack channels. A closely related problem (multiuser data hiding) was analyzed by Moulin and O'Sullivan [1] , and capacity expressions were obtained assuming expected-distortion constraints for the ngerprint distributor and the coalition, and noncooperating, single-user decoders. Although this problem presents clear mathematical similarities with the standard ngerprinting setup, it is quite different from the setup adopted in other ngerprinting papers and in this manuscript. This more standard setup was studied by Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [2, 3] , and connections with the problem of coding for the multiple-access channel (MAC) were explored. No constraints were imposed on the probability of false positives, which could approach 1. Lower bounds on capacity were obtained using a restrictive encoding strategy (random constant-composition codes without time sharing) and almost-sure distortion constraints between the pirated copy and one [2] or all [3] of the coalition's copies. The decoders in [1] [2] [3] assume a xed number of colluders, and admit no obvious extension to cope with the two challenges listed above.
Connections between the MAC problem and ngerprinting under the Boneh-Shaw assumption have also been studied recently by Anthapadmanabhan et al. [7] . The covertext is degenerate, and side information does not appear in the information-theoretic formulation of this problem. Bounds on capacity were also presented in [7] .
In order to cope with unknown collusion channels and unknown number of colluders, a special kind of universal decoder should be designed, with universality holds not only with respect to some set of channels, but also with respect to an unknown number of inputs. One would expect such a universal decoder to feature a tunable parameter that trades off the two fundamental types of error probability. When the number of colluders is unknown, two extreme instances of this tradeoff are to accuse all users or accuse none of them.
Recently Tardos [6] proposed a random ngerprinting scheme using what amounts to an auxiliary random sequence for encoding ngerprints. While this scheme is presented at an algorithmic level (and no optimization is involved in its construction), in our game-theoretic setting the auxiliary random variable appears fundamentally as part of a randomized strategy for a game whose payoff function is nonconcave with respect to the maximizing variable (the ngerprint distribution). It shoud also be mentioned that the decoding procedure in [6] , which correlates the pirated copy with individual ngerprints and outputs the highest-scoring one, is simple but suboptimal (not capacity-achieving).
Another issue that is resolved in our game-theoretic setting is the optimality of coalition strategies that are invariant to permutations of the colluders. While one may heuristically expect that such strategies are optimal, a proof of this property is established in this paper. The approach used in previous papers was to assume that coalitions employ such strategies.
Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, calligraphic letters for nite alphabets, and boldface letters for sequences. The probability mass function (PMF) of a random variable X ∈ X is denoted by p X = {p X (x), x ∈ X }. The entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by 
I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y
Mathematical expectation is denoted by the symbol E. All logarithms are in base 2 unless speci ed otherwise.
Let p x denote the empirical PMF (type) induced by a sequence x ∈ X N [11] . The type class T x associated with p x is the set of all sequences of type p x . Likewise, we de ne the joint type p xy of a pair of sequences (x, y) ∈ X N × Y N and T xy the type class associated with p xy . Also, we de ne the conditional type p y|x of a pair of sequences (x, y) as
for all x ∈ X such that p x (x) > 0. The conditional type class T y|x given x, denoted by T y|x (x), is the set of all sequences y such that (x,ỹ) ∈ T xy . We denote by H(x) the empirical entropy of the PMF p x and by I(x; y) the empirical mutual information for the joint PMF p xy . We use the calligraphic fonts P X and P N X to represent the set of all PMFs and all empirical PMFs, respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, P Y |X and P N Y |X denote the set of all conditional PMFs and all empirical conditional PMFs on the alphabet Y.
Mutual Information of k Random Variables
The mutual information of k random variables X 1 , · · · , X k is de ned as the sum of their individual entropies minus their joint entropy [11, p. 57] or equivalently, the divergence between their joint distribution and the product of their marginals:
. Similarly, we de ne the empirical mutual information
as the mutual information with respect to the joint
. This leads to the following alternative interpretation of the minimum-equivocation decoder of Liu and Hughes [9] . If x 1 , · · · , x k are codewords from a constantcomposition code C, then H(x i ) is the same for all i, and the minimum-equivocation decoder is equivalent to a maximummutual-information decoder (using Our model for digital ngerprinting is diagrammed in Fig. 1 . Let S, X , and Y be three nite alphabets. The covertext se-
STATEMENT OF THE
N consists of N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a PMF p S (s), s ∈ S. There are 2 NR users, each of which receives a ngerprinted copy:
N is the encoding function, and m is the index of the user. The encoder binds each ngerprinted copy x m to the original s via a distortion constraint. Let d : S × X → R + be the distortion measure and
be the extension of this measure to length-N sequences. The code f N is subject to the distortion constraint 2.2) ), or alternatively, a constraint that will be referred to as the Boneh-Shaw constraint. The formulation of these constraints is detailed below and results in the de nition of a feasible class W K of attacks.
The decoder knows neither K nor p Y|XK selected by the K colluders and has access to the pirated copy Y and the host S. It produces an estimateK = g N (Y, S) of the coalition. A possible decision is the empty set,K = ∅, re ecting the possibility that the signal submitted to the decoder is unrelated to the ngerprints. If this possibility was not allowed, an innocent user would be accused. Another good reason to allowK = ∅ is that reliable detection is impossible when there are too many colluders, and the probability of false positives should remain small for any coalition size.
The encoder/decoder pair (f N , g N ) is randomized, i.e., the choice of (f N , g N ) is a function of a random variable known to the encoder and decoder but not to the adversary. This random variable is independent of all other random variables and plays the role of a secret key. The randomized code is denoted by (F N , G N ) .
Our randomized codes are obtained using permutations of the letters {1, 2, · · · , N} (to eliminate apparent correlations across positions in the marked sequences), permutations of the ngerprint assignments (to ensure that error probabilities are the same for all coalitions), as well a special randomized sequence. An example of the latter was given by Tardos [6] . For binary alphabets S, X , and Y, iid random variables w i ∈ (0, 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , were generated according to some xed pmf, and next the ngerprint letters X i (m) were generated as independent Bernoulli(w i ) random variables. Here {w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } is the secret key shared by encoder and decoder.
For an embedding distortion D 1 and a coalition of size K using collusion channel p Y|XK in class W K , there corresponds a capacity C(D 1 , W K ) which is the supremum of all achievable R, under a prescribed error criterion. By xing R, D 1 , and a minimum value Δ for the false-positive error exponent, one aims at guaranteeing resistance to any coalition whose size does not exceed some number K max that depends on R, D 1 , Δ, and {W k , k ≥ 1}. In the remainder of this section, we detail the attack models and de ne the relevant error probabilities, capacities, and error exponents.
Collusion Channels
The delity constraint on the coalition is of the form p y|xK ∈ W K , i.e., the empirical pmf of the pirated copy given the marked copies is restricted in a sense that depends on the application. This model can be used to impose hard distortion constraints on the coalition or to enforce the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption when X = Y. Under this assumption, the colluders are not allowed to modify their samples at any location where these samples agree. The appropriate choice for W K in this case is the set of all p Y |XK that satis es
Hence the only constraint on y is that y i = x m1,i for any
We denote by W fair K the subset of W K that consists of fair collusion channels, i.e., channels that are invariant to permutations of the colluders.
Error Probabilities
There are several error probabilities of interest: the probability of false positives (one or more innocent users are accused), P F P (K) = P r[K ⊆ K], the probability of missed detection for a speci c coalition member m ∈ K, P e,m (K) = P r[m / ∈K], the probability of failing to catch a single colluder, P 
The tradeoff between false positives and false negatives can be put in the context of statistical detection theory (the Neyman-Pearson problem) as well as list decoding [10] . For the latter problem, the false-negative error exponent is larger if the list size is large, and approaches the sphere packing exponent if the list size grows subexponentially with N . (There is no notion of false positives for classical list decoding because errors are de ned by the event that the transmitted message is missing from the decoder's output list.) Likewise, the error exponents obtained in [2, 3] are obtained for false negatives only, using a xed list size. 
Capacity De nition 2.1 A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion
because an error event for the detect-one problem is also an error event for the detect-all problem.
Random-Coding Exponents
For a sequence (F N , G N ) of random codes the error exponents are given by
where E represents the random coding exponent E F P , E one , or E all , and P * the corresponding error
FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY
We now present a computable expression for ngerprinting capacity. Consider an auxiliary random variable W de ned over an alphabet W = {1, 2, · · · , L}. De ne the set
and the functions
are nondecreasing functions of L and converge to nite limits:
Moreover, the gap to the limit may be bounded by a polynomial function of L, hence this limit may be computed within any desired accuracy.
Theorem 3.1 Fingerprinting capacity is given by
C all (D 1 , W K ) under the "detect-all" criterion.
If the colluders select a fair collusion channel, as is their collective interest, the minimization is restricted to W fair K in (3.3), and then
The converse is proved in [8] . A scheme that achieves private ngerprinting capacity is presented in Sec. 4. Using a strong converse, we have also shown that capacity under the "detect-one" criterion for a fairly broad class of codes is given by C one (D 1 , W K ). The lower bounds on ngerprinting capacity derived in [2, 3] are of the form (3.2) with L = 1, i.e., the random variable W is degenerate. Since the payoff function I(X K ; Y |S) is generally nonconcave with respect to the variable p X|S of (3.1), a randomized strategy in which p X|S is randomized will generally outperform a deterministic strategy in which p X|S is xed. The auxiliary random variable W plays the role of selector of p X|S in this game.
Apparently the bene ts of this randomization can be dramatic for large K. For the Boneh-Shaw problem with L = 1,
; however Tardos' scheme achieves a rate O(K −2 ) which is therefore a lower bound on C one (D 1 , W K ).
RANDOM CODING SCHEME
Our random coding scheme is parameterized by three parameters K nom , L and Δ. We present the scheme here and give its error exponents in the next section. It is also shown that ngerprinting capacity is achieved in the limit as Δ → 0.
The encoder assumes a nominal value K nom for coalition size. An arbitrarily large L is selected, de ning an alpha-
N is drawn independently of s and uniformly from a type class T w to be optimized. This sequence is shared with the receiver. A rate-R conditionally constant-composition code C(s,
NR } is generated for each (s, w) by drawing 2 NR sequences independently from the uniform distribution over a conditional type class T x|sw to be optimized. User m is assigned codeword x(m). The parameter K nom is used to optimize the joint types T w and T x|sw ; see (5.5) .
The decision rule is parameterized by Δ ≥ 0 that controls the fundamental tradeoff between probabilities of false positives and false negatives.
The restriction of X M to a subset A of M will be denoted by X A = {X m , m ∈ A}. For disjoint sets A = {m 1 , · · · , m |A| } and B, we denote by
With this notation, we de ne the function
where k = |K|, and
is the empirical mutual information of the k + 1 sequences x 1 , · · · , x k , y, conditioned on (s, w), as de ned in Sec. 1.2. Our joint ngerprint decoder is a Maximum Penalized Mutual Information (MPMI) decoder:
The decoder seeks the coalition size k and the codewords x m , m ∈ K, in C(s, w) that achieve the MPMI criterion above. The indices of these codewords form the decoded coalitionK. If the minimizing k in (4.2) is zero, the receiver outputsK = ∅. The MPMI criterion (4.2) can equivalently be formulated as a Minimum Penalized Equivocation decoder. The value of the criterion can serve as a con dence measure for the level of guilt of the coalition.
ERROR EXPONENTS
Recall P XKW |S de ned in (3.1). De ne now the following set of conditional pmf's for X K given W whose conditional marginal pmf p X|SW is the same for each X m , m ∈ K:
De ne for each A ⊆ K the set of conditional pmf's
and the pseudo sphere packing exponent 
